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1	UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
2	SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
3	Case No. 09-50026 (REG)
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6	In the Matter of:
7	GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION,
8	Debtors.
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12	United States Bankruptcy Court
13	One Bowling Green
14	New York, New York
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16	September 24, 2012
17	9:49 AM
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21	BEFORE:
22	HON. ROBERT E. GERBER
23	U.S. BANKRUPTCY JUDGE
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25	ECRO - MATTHEW

Page 2 1 HEARING re Motion of Jaspan Schlesinger LLP to withdraw as 2 counsel of record for Woodbury Cadillac, LLC 3 Motion for objection to claim(s) number: 50085 of Autonation, 4 5 Inc. 6 7 Motors Liquidation Company GUC Trust's Objection to Claim No. 66309 filed by Castle Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. and Claim No. 8 9 66310 filed by Grossinger Autoplex, Inc. 10 Motors Liquidation Company GUC Trust's objection to Claim(s) 11 12 number 71060 13 14 Objection to Claim #29628 filed by Tiesha McNeal 15 16 Objection to Claim(s) Number 62969 filed by John A. Haack 17 Debtor's 187th Omnibus Objection to Claims (qualified defined 18 19 benefits, pension benefits claim of former salaried and hourly 20 employees) 21 22 Debtor's 186th Omnibus Objection to Claims (qualified defined 23 benefits, pension benefits claims of former salaried and hourly 24 employees) 25

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1	227th Omnibus Objection to Claims (welfare benefits claims of
2	retired and former salaries and executive employees)
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4	237th Omnibus Objection to Claims (claims relating to former
5	employees represented by United Auto Workers)
6	
7	243rd Omnibus Objection to Claims and Motion requesting
8	enforcement of Bar Date Orders Overstreet Claim #s 70471, 70469
9	& 70470
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11	262nd Omnibus Objection to Claim(s) (pension benefits claims of
12	former salaried and hourly employees)
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14	282nd Omnibus Objection to Claim(s)
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16	283rd Omnibus Objection to Claim(s)
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18	284th Omnibus Objection to Claim(s)
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20	285th Omnibus Objection to Claims
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25	Transcribed by: Sheila Orms

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Page 7 PROCEEDINGS 1 2 THE COURT: Good morning. Have seats, please. 3 Mr. Griffiths, good morning. 4 MR. GRIFFITHS: Good morning, Your Honor. David Griffiths of Weil, Gotshal & Manges for the Motors Liquidation 5 6 Company GUC Trust. 7 THE COURT: Do you have a recommendation as to the order in which you'd like to deal with the matters today? 8 9 MR. GRIFFITHS: Yes, please, Your Honor. I have my 10 colleague, Angela Zambrano of Weil, Gotshal & Manges to present item number 1 on the agenda, and then we would propose to speed 11 12 through the -- a number of matters that Weil Gotshal is 13 handling before handing over to Dickstein Shapiro for the 14 remaining matters on the agenda. 15 THE COURT: Well, that sounds fine, Mr. Griffiths. 16 MR. GRIFFITHS: Okay. 17 THE COURT: Ms. Zambrano, do you want to come up, 18 please? Mr. Brown, are you on the phone? 19 MS. ZAMBRANO: I believe they announced him when we 20 were beginning. 21 THE COURT: Mark Brown for the Castillo plaintiffs? 22 MR. BROWN: Yes, Your Honor. Can --23 THE COURT: Now I can hear you. Okay. Now I can hear 24 you fine. 25 MR. BROWN: Good morning, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Good morning. Folks, I've read the papers and the issues here I think are not as difficult as they were in some other class action certification matters, that I dealt with, most significantly the Apartheid matter, although I was puzzled by the lack of mention of that decision in the papers on each side.

I'd like both sides to be prepared to address a couple of questions that I have. One, am I right in my understanding that Old GM is not objecting to the \$4 million in fees that was provided for under the original settlement, and which I would understand to be an element of rejection damages, possibly accounting for why, if I'm right, Old GM isn't objecting to them.

But vis a vis the other entitlements under the original settlement, I'd like to know if a class were to be certified, whether we would then have to set up a reserve or whether a reserve has already been set up to take into account liabilities under the settlement, which could then have a spillover effect on the other creditors in the Old GM estate, who presumably would be getting supplemental distributions as claims are resolved, or who conversely would have to wait on getting supplemental distributions to the extent they weren't.

I also want both sides to deal with how I would deal with the estimation process for that. I have in the past had to have estimation proceedings or otherwise to deal with

estimation for reserves. I'd also like to know how we would notice the 149,000 or whatever the exact number is of members of the class, and how much it would cost. And what the proposals are for who would bear the cost if we were to do that.

I want both sides to be prepared to address the effect on GM's other creditors, Old GM's other creditors of the certification that's been requested here.

Ms. Zambrano, you came up to the main lectern presumably as claims objector. Why don't you lead off and then I'll give Mr. Brown a chance to be heard, you a chance to reply if you want to, and Mr. Brown a chance to sur-reply if he wants to in the latter two cases limited to the new stuff that's discussed.

MS. ZAMBRANO: Thank you, Your Honor. I'm sorry if I jumped the gun. I heard my name and popped up. This is probably my last hearing before Your Honor. As you may be aware, I have been handling the class claims against the Old GM, and this is the last one on the claims register that's purported to be a class claim.

It also presents, as Your Honor has indicated, not the most difficult issues under Rule 23, but some real practical concerns that we've had in trying to administer or trying to resolve rather this claim.

On the one hand, we have a judgment that has been

entered. I will note that the agreement was not final under its terms, but we certainly have a final judgment, and we have a federal court that has applied Rule 23 and decided that it should be a class settlement. On the other hand --

THE COURT: Pause, please, Ms. Zambrano. And I should've picked it up from the papers, forgive me, you and Mr. Brown both forgive me.

Was the class certified for settlement purposes only or was it certified as a class deserving of going forward and then settled?

MS. ZAMBRANO: It was certified as the settlement class, although if you read the Supreme Court decisions of late, there should be no difference. But it was certified in the connection with the class settlement.

THE COURT: Okay. Continue.

MS. ZAMBRANO: And so on the one hand we do have a federal court who's looked at this and has said that Rule 23 applies and has entered a judgment on a settlement, a stipulation of settlement. On the other hand, you have a very different situation than we've had in all of the class claims that I'm aware of against this estate. And frankly in my practice, as a class action practitioner, in this case, when we had a stipulation of settlement between the plaintiffs and Old GM in July of 2008, all the way back then, we had Old GM come forward and say, we're going to just start paying the

consideration that is due under the settlement or that will be due.

I'm sure it comes to no surprise to you that it took some time for that to work through -- its way through the system, and have the papers filed, the Court have a hearing, objectors look at it, all of that until finally we had a final hearing in April of 2009.

We all know that the world looked quite different during -- at that point, but in that whole time period that Old GM had stood up, actually it was in February had stood up and said we'll start honoring it. We had thousands of people come forward and millions of dollars were paid pursuant to that settlement before ultimately the company filed for bankruptcy.

And so that is very different than anyone that -- any other class action that we have where creditors or excuse me, where class action plaintiffs before final judgment were able to recover.

And then, of course, we had the filing. And there was a period of time after the filing in which New GM, I think Your Honor noted in the adversary proceeding ruling, probably out of confusion, who knows, but New GM continued to pay the settlement that was due under the class action settlement agreement. And so you had millions more paid under -- by New GM under the terms of the settlement.

And then, of course, New GM decided that it would

change its policy, but it would still reimburse these class members. Those class members then have been in the very enviable position, from my view, who as part of representing GM I also mediate cases in which unsecured claimants with -- that are very horribly injured and have claims and mediate their claims against the estate, they have not been in the position of being able to recover anything before they work theirsevles through this process.

These class members were not in that situation. They were able to recover first whatever they would've been entitled to under the class action settlement, and then even whole dollars from New GM to obtain reimbursement.

And so we think when we're trying to resolve this for the best interests of the estate, and that the creditors, we look at that situation versus what the Court initially started with, the federal court in California. And we don't think that this is a situation where you could just allow this class claim for the amount that's been filed because there's a judgment.

We don't know within that class, that former class, in my opinion, whether -- who should obtain consideration from the estate and how much. And so there has to be some sort of process if the Court would permit that to continue at all.

It is our opinion, the Trust's view, that enough is enough. They've had sufficient notice of their rights under -- against Old GM and then New GM, and they had the opportunity to

obtain not an unsecured class claim and whatever that's worth presently, but whole dollars from Old GM and then New GM. And so at this juncture to require either the plaintiffs or the estate to renotice that class, we think does not make sense.

Now, I want to address the specific questions that Your Honor raised, and I can -- some of them are easy to deal with.

The first question that you asked was whether Old GM is not objecting to the \$4 million in fees. The answer to that question is yes, that is correct, we are not objecting. And the reason why we are not objecting is if you look at the value that this class actually obtained -- excuse me, this class counsel actually obtained for the class, it's substantial. They -- their work and that process started a process by which \$35 million was obtained and value was obtained for the class members.

And so we think that that's an amount that we know, they've proved it to the federal court in California, and we don't have an objection to that now.

The next question that you asked if class was certified, would we have to set up a reserve. I'm going to have to check with my client to be a hundred percent sure on this. But it's my understanding that a reserve has been set up in the amount of the claim. But I can confirm that for Your Honor. And so, in other words, would there be -- you know,

would there be a possibility -- was there a small reserve set up such that we would have to go back and upset the apple cart with respect to other claimants. I don't think so. I think the reserve was set at the amount of the claim.

THE COURT: Pause, please. If that is still then, that means we don't have to create a new reserve, but the existence of the reserve is in substance holding back money that could otherwise go to other creditors.

MS. ZAMBRANO: That's right. And the other prejudice that the other creditors are dealing with, of course, is the timing of this to the extent that additional notice would be, you know, provided to the class.

I thought that in focusing on these issues this morning, it occurred to me, this isn't just an issue of notice. Because it's not like if we just noticed the people and they come forward that then we can say, ah-ha, that's the amount of the claim. We -- every class member was supposed to get \$50 and you have -- now we have 200 more people that are coming forward, that's the amount and we go forward.

This was a very complicated settlement in which people had to submit specific forms of reimbursement, and they were entitled to certain amounts, you know, if they substantiated what that consideration level under the settlement agreement was. It's not just a multiplied by the number of claimants that show up. And so there's actually notice and

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administration costs here.

And in our view, certainly the estate shouldn't pay for that, given the notice that has already been given to the class and paid for by Old GM initially with specifically, with respect to this claim, and then with New GM, of course, as well.

You said how we would notice this class. I don't know the answer to that, Your Honor. I know that we would start, of course, by going to New GM and getting the records of the Saturn owners during this time period that had already been sent two letters, that would be the first place to start. I suppose you could do some sort of publication notice. I don't know. I do know that whatever notice, if it was specific to the claimant, would be the third type of notice that we would've provided to them. And I don't have an estimate of the costs. Again I will say I don't think it's the estate that should bear that at this point.

We've cited a couple of cases in our papers, Your Honor, for the proposition that the plaintiffs that are bringing this case should bear that cost.

THE COURT: Now, at one time notice was sent to presumably the 149,000 class members back in prepetition plenary litigation. Am I right that if you were willing to pay the cost for 149,000 class members, you could simply send them mailings using the old address list that we used back then?

MS. ZAMBRANO: That would be the only way I would know how to proceed. That's definitely what we would do. Although, of course, we would research it further. That's where we would start with getting the addresses from New GM, we don't have them. But then, and that's what I was trying to highlight, it's not just sending the notice and then waiting for things to come in, and multiplying by that number of claimants. It's the administration of the cost. Which in my view in class action litigation can be substantial. Someone has to deal with each of those things that come back, figure out how they -- where they fall in the settlement, how many miles did they have at the time, were they the original owner, whether they should be -- what portion should they be entitled to of the menu of consideration that's provided under that agreement.

THE COURT: So are you saying it's more than simply multiplying the cost of a mailing of postage by 149,000?

MS. ZAMBRANO: Exactly, exactly.

THE COURT: Go on, please.

MS. ZAMBRANO: And then I think I want to end with your last question because it ties into all of this, you know, how would you deal with an estimation process here.

I don't think we can begin to estimate until we figure out who we're really dealing with. And so the notice cost, the administration cost and go from there. I think then we can do an estimation.

You could remember the DEX-COOL claimants that we had before you, in those situations, and in one other I believe, the Solders Class (ph), I know Your Honor has had a lot with them -- this case.

THE COURT: Frankly, the only one I really remember well at this point is Apartheid.

MS. ZAMBRANO: Well, I'll tell you in those cases, we were able to achieve some sort of resolution with the class claimants because where the bankruptcy fell in the life of that class action was the notice had come out -- had gone out, the class action papers or the claim forms had gone out, and the claim forms, some of them had come back. And so they were sitting in a box somewhere. And we could either estimate for Solders, because there is again, there's administration, substantial administration costs in going through those, but we could do that.

With GM, we could extrapolate how much someone would be entitled to under the settlement. We don't have that here.

We -- I can think of no reasonably practical way to estimate this claim at this juncture, and I don't think plaintiff's counsel can either.

And so the situation that we're in is we have to go through this notice and full administration of a class claim to get to, what I believe at the end of the day, are no claimants. I think anyone who's had a claim for a transmission problem

with this year of Saturn during this entire time period would've gone and gotten whole dollars from either Old GM in the beginning, the moment it was announced, or certainly as Old GM was having financial problems, you'd bring your car in. And after that time period, of course, New GM stood ready and stands ready today to reimburse people for those same problems.

And so I don't think at the end of the day after all of this work you're actually going to find claimants. And so that's why we ultimately decided that the most appropriate way to resolve this for the estate, and all the other creditors that we're dealing with and must think about as well, is to expunge the class claimant at this juncture.

We are, of course, allowing any individual claim that was filed on these problem -- because of these problems.

That's, of course, appropriate. It's the class nature, the representative nature, I just don't think has a place in this bankruptcy at this point.

THE COURT: Pause please, Ms. Zambrano. Something you said in your most recent remarks got my attention. Did I understand you to say that even to this date, New GM is bellying up to the bar on making repairs for class members?

MS. ZAMBRANO: Yes, Your Honor. What they have agreed to do, they agreed some time ago and have been honoring it, is to reimburse class members up to 80,000 -- excuse me, 100,000 miles or eight years from the date of purchase for this

particular problem at 50 percent. So it's not the whole dollars or a hundred percent reimbursement that was under the settlement. And it's not the hundred percent that the New GM was paying immediately post bankruptcy, but they are doing that. They also have a program with respect to the trade in value, and I don't know the details of that.

THE COURT: In essence, it's like a voucher that you can apply towards the purchase of a new vehicle in some amount?

MS. ZAMBRANO: I think that's right. But it's -there's two components of the consideration. But the 50
percent of just cash that you're out is the one that I don't
think someone, you know, that went through this entire process
would say, oh, I'm going to wait, and I'm going to have my
class claim be administered in the bankruptcy, and I'm going to
get pennies on the dollar, and that's the way I want to be
reimbursed. I just don't think that makes sense.

THE COURT: Did I properly understand you to say that up to an earlier time, rather than getting paid at the 50 percent rate, the totality of the repair costs were absorbed by either Old GM or New GM?

MS. ZAMBRANO: Yeah, the settlement that Old GM entered into was for -- again, you have to fit into our certain bucket, but for a certain bucket, purchased a new car within a certain number of years, I think it's 80 maybe 100,000 miles, if you came in, and you had your repair costs, you'd get them a

Pg 20 of 56 Page 20 1 hundred percent covered. Okay. And that was -- and Mr. Brown 2 can -- knows the details far more than -- better than I do. 3 But that was the deal under the old settlement, and New GM --4 and Old GM honored that for five, six months, paid \$14 million in that type of reimbursement. 5 6 New GM also did for a period of time after the filing, and paid about 5 -- between 5 and \$6 million. And the 7 consideration again that New GM is paying, is different, but 8 9 it's whole dollars reimbursement, and they stand ready to do so 10 today if the vehicle, you know, fits into that category. THE COURT: Okay. Anything else? 11 12 MS. ZAMBRANO: Not at this time, Your Honor, thank 13 you. 14 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Brown? 15 MR. BROWN: Yes, Your Honor. I think the parties are 16 in agreement that the Court has discretion here with this 17 situation. The challenge I think in exercising that discretion is, and Ms. Zambrano has touched on it, the substantial relief 18 19 that a significant number of class members have already 20 received. I'm not aware, and spent a good amount of time 21 looking for perhaps something that might guide the Court in these circumstances. And I'm simply aware of none. 22 23

I think this may be an unprecedented set of circumstances for the Court to consider. Having said that, of course, we certainly request that the Court exercise its

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discretion in favor of the class members and permit the proof of claim, and deny the motion.

To answer the Court's specific questions, let me start with the estimation question first because I might be able to shed the most light on that, that particular question.

In the underlying district court proceeding in California, as part of the final approval process, we secured the services of an independent actuary to estimate the total value of the relief to the class under settlement, the terms of the settlement. Of course, at that time, it was anticipated that the settlement would be fully honored, and we weren't anticipating bankruptcy.

And what the actuary did was he reviewed the claims data that GM provided in terms of the warranty data for vehicles that were visited by GM repair shops at the time, and then extrapolated for what the likely failure rate would be going forward. And recognizing that the settlement essentially called for an extended warranty taking the vehicles to 125,000 miles, Mr. Johnson, the actuary, estimated that the total value of relief to the class was 50 -- approximately \$57 million.

Of that 57 million, I believe he determined that approximately 47 million represented what he expected to be the costs of payment to class members for repairs and relief under the settlement agreement. The remaining approximately 10 million represented administration costs and overhead,

personnel training, and significantly profit to the -- an insurer, because he estimated this as if it were to be -- as a liability if it were to be purchased by an insurance company or an extended warranty company that they would then go ahead and administer the settlement.

So considering that, his estimate that was that the pay-out to actual class members would be approximately 47 million. We now know from records provided by GM that approximately 36 million has been paid as a result of the class judgment, either by honoring the specific terms a hundred percent, or in the form of the alternative relief that New GM has since imposed.

And so I suppose one way to look at this would be that if you subtract 36 million from 47, that's \$11 million, and it's also the case that because of the GM -- what I'll call the buy back program, where it was \$5,000 I understand for a trade in on one of these class vehicles. As a result of that, a number of vehicles were removed from the roads, and so that might also affect the estimates of how many repairs there will be going forward. Obviously, if the cars are not on the road, they're not being driven and they can't fail. So there would be that intact as well.

So I do think there is a reasonable basis for estimating. We haven't formalized that information to make it available to the Court. I'm happy to do that. But that's

certainly something for the Court to take into account. And I hope I've answered the Court's questions in that regard.

I think Ms. Zambrano answered the question about the reserve and therefore, the impact on other creditors. In terms of notice to the class, and how that would be accomplished and would be paid for, it is the case that in a typical class action outside the bankruptcy context, prior to trial or judgment, it's typically the responsibility of their class counsel to pay for notice to the class. However, in the case of a settlement, it's typically the defendant who pays for the notice and that was certainly the case her. Old GM paid for notice to the class, and not only did Old GM pay for the original notice to the class, but Old GM also agreed it was by Old GM's request actually that they wanted a two-step process, whereby claim forms would be sent in addition to the initial notice.

And so that was an undertaking that Old GM agreed to.

In this context, if the Court were to undertake an estimation process, it seems that a compromised position might be that out of the -- I suppose, as class members submitted claim forms, that really is the only way I know of to identify the exact amount that may still be owed to class members who haven't yet received any recovery. And I suppose it would be possible to provide for those notice costs out of that pool.

THE COURT: Pause, please, Mr. Brown. To what extent did class members send back claim forms with respect to

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individual amounts that they would want for their pieces of the pie under the overall settlement?

MR. BROWN: Well, unfortunately that was the problem, Your Honor. The judgment was final, and unappealable prior to the petition, the bankruptcy petition being filed.

Unfortunately, the deadline under the agreement and under the judgment for Old GM to send claim forms was June 2nd. And as the Court knows, the bankruptcy petition was filed on June 1st.

So there weren't actual claim forms sent to the class members as contemplated by the judgment because the bankruptcy petition intervened.

THE COURT: Uh-huh. Continue, please.

MR. BROWN: I think the last question for me to answer was actually the Court's first question and Ms. Zambrano touched on it. You asked whether Old GM was objecting to the proof of claim form of class counsel's fees, and I understand that the trust is not objecting.

I'd simply like to add to that, Your Honor, in addition, of course, to the very substantial relief that the classes received as a result of our efforts, and we're very proud of that, the difference between the proof of claim filed on behalf of class counsel and filed on behalf of the entire class, although we're both judgment creditors, we in the class, the difference is as class counsel we have a liquidated claim, and obviously were identifiable, they are not the

administrative issues that unfortunately involved the class.

But we have engaged in this litigation since 2007, and without any -- not only without any promise of recovery, but in addition to the significant time that we've expended, there's been significant expense both in terms of prosecuting the underlying case, prosecuting the adversary proceeding which by the way, class counsel continues to pursue by way of appeal to Judge Jones. And there have been out of pocket costs in terms of hiring personnel to handle the influx of calls, and to engage local counsel to assist with the adversary proceeding and the bankruptcy proceeding in New York. And so there's been a significant outlay. And we're -- although we would have preferred to prevail already in the adversary proceeding, we're very proud of the efforts that have taken place so far and the results for the class.

And I believe that answers the Court's questions.

THE COURT: Okay. Anything further, Mr. Brown?

MR. BROWN: Not that I can think of, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Ms. Zambrano, any reply?

MS. ZAMBRANO: Two things. First of all, I just want to note with respect to the \$57 million number that was thrown out there, that was not a number that was at all agreed to by Old GM, sanctioned by the Court, whatever. That was the plaintiff's number, and so you know, we can't agree to that. But let's just set that aside and decide or suppose that you

could come up with some number from that expert number that the plaintiff had versus what we've -- we know from New GM and Old GM's records show that's been paid to this class.

That still gets us to the same spot that we're at.

Even if you put a number on it, and it's a lesser number, and that is how do you administer that to people who actually haven't been compensated at all in this process. And that, of course, is very important to the trust because of the other claimants that we must also recognize their rights.

So I think the real problem here is we cannot identify without substantial administrative burden anyone who hasn't received not one, but two times notice of their rights. And given that New GM stands ready to compensate people for this problem, albeit a limited number, not all of them, they have to meet New GM's requirements as well, we think it is inappropriate for the trust to be bearing this as a cost claim.

Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you. Everybody sit in place for a minute.

(Pause)

THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, in the exercise of my discretion, I'm declining to make adversary rule Bankruptcy Rule 7023 and Civil Rule 23 applicable to this contested matter vis a vis the allowance of the claims of the transmission class members on a class basis for the avoidance of doubt, having no

ruling vis a vis those asserting similar claims on an individual basis. And the following are the bases for the exercise of my discretion in connection with this determination.

Both sides agree that it's within my discretion to make this determination. And in the respects relevant here, there is no material disputed issue of fact. I worked with the facts that were stipulated to by the Castillo plaintiffs.

The law informing the exercise of my discretion likewise is not disputed. Much of it appears in my earlier decision in this very bankruptcy case In Re Motors Liquidation Company, what I sometimes refer to as the Apartheid decision, 447 B.R. 150, starting at page 155.

As I there discussed, while I normally start with textual analysis in any dispute where such is relevant, textual analysis is of only limited utility when bankruptcy judges like me are asked to determine whether they should apply Bankruptcy Rule 7023 and Civil Rule 23 to contested matters.

The Bankruptcy Code is silent on the extent to which a claim may be filed on behalf of persons other than the claimant, or the standards under which a Court might find that to be appropriate. And the bankruptcy rules in the respects relevant here are as well.

Class certification in cases under the Bankruptcy Code is expressly addressed in Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procure

7023, which provides that Rule 23 FRCP applies in adversary proceedings. But claims allowance matters, when objected to, are contested matters, not adversary proceedings, and instead are governed by Bankruptcy Rule 9014, which is silent as to class action treatment or incorporation of Rule -- Civil Rule 23.

And in respect of what I just said, I was effectively reading from my earlier decision in the GM Apartheid decision, 447 B.R. at pages 155 to 156. As I then went on to say in that same decision, an analysis that is equally applicable here, Bankruptcy Rule 9014(c), captioned application of Part 7 rules provides, that except as otherwise provided in this rule, and unless the Court directs otherwise, the following rules shall apply. Rule 9014(c) continues with a fairly long listing of Part 7 rules that unless the Court directs otherwise, apply to contested matters. But Rule 7023 is not one of them.

Thus, Rule 7023 doesn't apply in contested matters, quote, unless the Courts directs otherwise, end quote. But while at least implying that a bankruptcy court has the power to direct otherwise, and thus to apply Rule 7023, and hence, Civil Rule 23 in claims allowance matters, Rule 9014 is silent as to standards under which courts should do so.

Thus, as in so many areas where the Code and rules are silent, bankruptcy courts look to case law to fill the gaps.

In this district, it's been held that while class

proofs of claim in bankruptcy are not prohibited, the right to file one is not absolute. The decision to extend civil rules application, Rule 23's application is committed to the Court's discretion. The exercise of that discretion is informed by special considerations applicable in bankruptcy cases that are super imposed on those that apply in any determination under Civil Rule 23.

Although the Bankruptcy Code and rules give no express guidance for the Court's exercise of this discretion, a pervasive theme is avoiding undue delay in the administration of the case. And Judge Gropper of this court has observed, that the affect of a class claim on other creditors is an important factor in a Court's decision as to whether to exercise its discretion and grant Rule 23 certification.

Here I determined that bankruptcy concerns make it inappropriate for me to make Civil Rule 23 applicable to this claim. In addition, I determine that by reason of changed circumstances, it would also be inappropriate to certify the class with or without consideration of those Rule 23 concerns.

Here, much of the information that has -- that is relevant to the class certification determination was recognized. I don't want to say conceded. I want to say recognized by the Castillo plaintiffs.

Their responding brief here displayed candor that frankly I don't always see in the submissions by lawyers in

cases on my watch. For that candor, I am grateful. But let me talk for a minute about some of the undisputed facts which with that candor they recognized, and I'm looking to pages 2 to 3 of their responsive brief.

Thousands of class members have already received reimbursement as a result of the class judgment in an amount exceeding \$36 million. They did so because the class judgment extended the transmission warranty, essentially providing specific performance as a remedy. Old GM provided complete relief to class members through July 9, 2009. New GM provided complete relief to class members through September 29, 2009, and New GM provided alternate relief thereafter and continues to do so.

As I've stated in other contexts, specific performance is unavailable as a remedy to any debtor that concludes that it's inappropriate or inconsistent with the needs and concerns of other creditors. But where, of course, it has been provided, the debtor has in substance given full relief to those who got that benefit, in effect, 100 percent dollars as contrasted to what we in the bankruptcy community refer to as little bitty bankruptcy dollars, which in the case of insolvent debtors, which is what we have here, are worth a lot less than full performance.

As the Castillo plaintiffs again with candor recognized, and I'm reading from the bottom of page 2 of their

response, there is no evidence or reason to believe that any class member who was otherwise entitled to relief under the class judgment, and at any time between February of 2009 and January 1, 2012 requested reimbursement from Old GM or New GM was not offered at least some relief, in accordance with one of the policies described in detail below.

The Castillo plaintiffs did not dispute that the GUC

Trust would be entitled to a set off with respect to such class
members. They continued, and I'm quoting, "However identifying
the specific class members as to whom the set off would apply
and the specific set off amount for each one, would require an
administrative process whose cost in relation to the value of
remaining relief, if in fact, they are entitled class members
who did not already receive reimbursement is unknown. This
information could not be known without incurring the cost of
providing additional notice and claim forms to all members of
the certified class." And here we have a class of 149,000
members.

Likewise at page 7 paragraph 19, the Castillo plaintiffs recognized that without providing claim forms to each of the approximately 149,000 class members, they knew of no way to determine which, if any, of the class members who had not already received their share of the more \$36 million already reimbursed by Old GM or New GM might be entitled to additional relief under the class judgment. Nor could they

specify the dollar value of any such remaining relief.

And then once again, they recognize that the class judgment essentially required specific performance of an extended warranty, and there was no way to know how many class members experienced unreimbursed transmission failures during the pendency of the bankruptcy.

The Castillo class properly recognized that where a class is certified prepetition, that is significant to a Court's determination. And if it were the case, and this is classic dictum I guess, where a class had been certified prepetition and afterwards, there was no change in the facts between the prepetition class certification and the time the bankruptcy judge was asked to rule on class certification, such a fact would heavily weigh on continuing class certification during the post petition period.

But the facts have changed, and that is still only one of the factors that we bankruptcy judges consider in deciding whether to grant class certification. We still have to analyze the interplay between class certification and the needs and concerns of administering the Chapter 11 case, and in particular, the needs and concerns of other creditors.

Here, it is recognized by both sides that many, if not most, if not all of the class members have now received the benefits for which the class action was brought. Indeed, that's one reason why Old GM did not object to the payment of

fees, and why I am not of a mind to question the payment of fees even on my own initiative. There is no doubt that by reason of the \$36 million in benefits, the class was benefitted. Everything now known to me suggests that the class counsel did their jobs and got the benefit of a class action for which we looked to class actions to achieve.

But the issue is today not whether class action counsel should get the \$4 million in fees, as an allowed claim, that matter is to my mind, behind us. It is rather the extent to which I should certify a class for the unknown number of class plaintiffs who after those four separate mechanisms still might have something due and owing.

Here, it is undisputed that the costs of that are substantial. There is uncertain benefit to be obtained, if any. And then other bankruptcy concerns also dictate denying further class action certification here.

Whenever an unliquidated sum is sought to be recovered as part of a class action, at least in a liquidating plan, we have a need to set up a reserve to do so. It appears to be undisputed that a reserve was established, but because that reserve was established by definition, that makes funds or consideration, here the funds are not strictly cash money, it involves allocated stock, but the principle is the same, that are unavailable for distribution to other creditors.

We can, if we choose to, engage in a claims estimation

process for that purpose, but claims estimation processes are expensive, and by definition, less precise than actual claims allowance matters.

In addition, while I do not quarrel with the use at the time of actuarial assumptions, all of those actuarial assumptions have in effect become obsolete by reason of the passage of time and the further remedial action, and Old GM hasn't had a chance to be heard on whether even those actuarial assumptions were correct at the time.

Dealing with all of this would be expensive, and result in delay, which is particularly a matter of concern by reason of the late time by which class certification has been sought. I do not need to decide and do not today decide whether the passage of three years since the time of the filing of the case is by itself enough to warrant denial of class certification here.

But the passage of time is nevertheless of relevance and it's of particular relevance because facts have changed since the time class certification might have been sought, and the time that I am now asked to rule upon this.

Likewise, the ameliorative activities taken since the original class action motion was brought in plainery litigation, undercut my ability to make some of the findings that I would be required to make under Rules 23(a) and 23(b) of the civil rules. I don't need to address that because the

impropriety, or at least inappropriateness of certifying a class now and making Rule 23 applicable to this contested matter is so obvious, but I do note that such concerns would likely make it impossible for me to find the required numerosity or the finding that class action is preferable to non-bankruptcy consideration of individual claims. All, of course, aside from its impropriety in bankruptcy cases.

For all of these reasons in the exercise of my discretion, I am not going to use my discretion to make Rule 23, Civil Rule 23 applicable to this contested matter. But for the avoidance of doubt, the individual claims of people who have filed still feel that they haven't gotten full relief remain.

Likewise, the claim of class counsel for its fee under the original settlement remains.

Ms. Zambrano, it appears from the thoughtful and constructive response that was given by your opponent, there is a very high likelihood that you can work out a consensual order consistent with the foregoing. I want you to try. If you can't do that, you're authorized to settle an order on no less than one week's notice by fax or e-mail.

Your order can and should provide that for the avoidance of doubt, that this ruling does not impair the rights of class counsel to recover the fee to which they were entitled under original settlement, and should also provide again for the avoidance of doubt, although I think it's obvious, that

Page 36 this is without prejudice to the rights, if any, of the 1 2 Castillo plaintiffs in their efforts on their appeal against 3 New GM. 4 I'm only deciding the class claims allowance that is now before me. Not by way of reargument, are there any 5 6 questions? 7 MS. ZAMBRANO: No, Your Honor. THE COURT: Mr. Brown? 8 9 MR. BROWN: No, thank you, Your Honor. 10 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Brown, if you choose to, you 11 can drop off the phone. 12 MR. BROWN: Thank you very much, Your Honor. 13 THE COURT: Thank you. Have a good day. 14 MR. BROWN: Thank you. 15 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Griffiths? 16 MR. GRIFFITHS: Thank you. With the Court's 17 permission, Ms. Zambrano can be excused for the remainder of 18 the hearing? 19 THE COURT: Oh, yes. Ms. Zambrano, you're likewise 20 excused if you choose to be. 21 MR. GRIFFITHS: Thank you, Your Honor, David Griffiths 22 of Weil, Gotshal & Manges for the Motors Liquidation Company 23 GUC Trust. 24 Your Honor, the only other substantive matter for this 25 hearing is item number 2 on the agenda that my colleague,

Stephanie Greer from Dickstein Shapiro will deal with shortly.

Items number 3 through 7 relate to omnibus objection to claims of former employees of the debtors who did not submit responses to the omnibus objections to their claims. However, at some point during the case, contacted the debtors and requested an adjournment.

Following that, we've contacted these claimants by letter to request formal responses. No responses were received. This has been done at least twice, and therefore we'd now like to proceed to enter orders expunging their claims. I have one claim that I've spoken to, which will be Ms. Coscarelli for which I'd like to make a statement for the record.

Mr. Brennan (ph) has agreed to withdraw his claim, and Ms. Roman we've worked with separately to address certain concerns she had with her insurance company.

THE COURT: Very well.

MR. GRIFFITHS: Your Honor, for the purposes of the record, Ms. Coscarelli filed or has requested the following statement be read into the record.

Ms. Coscarelli is the beneficiary of a pension that is now paid for by New GM and the omnibus objection to her proof of claim which was protective in nature in no way affects the pension that's currently being paid by New GM. And in that respect, her pension is secure subject to obviously New GM's

09-50026-mg Doc 12116 Filed 09/26/12 Entered 10/03/12 14:57:57 Main Document Pg 38 of 56 Page 38 1 ongoing financial viability. 2 THE COURT: Very well. Then the supplemental relief 3 you requested is granted Mr. Griffiths. And once again, I want 4 to note my appreciation for the courteous way by which you've 5 dealt with these individual claimants. Thank you. 6 MR. GRIFFITHS: It's our pleasure, Your Honor. 7 And one uncontested matter, which is the 285th omnibus 8 objection to claims, which relates to pension benefits, pension 9 benefit claims of former salaries and hourly employees. 10 relates to seven claims, it's uncontested, and request the 11 Court's permission to enter an order. 12 THE COURT: Yes, sir, granted. 13 MR. GRIFFITHS: Thank you, Your Honor. And then, Your 14 Honor, that concludes the matters that are contested for -- at 15 least for Weil. There's one uncontested matter, and it's my 16 pleasure to present Edward Wu, who's an associate of Weil, 17 Gotshal & Manges to present item number 1, which is the GUC 18 Trust objection to Claim No. 66309. THE COURT: Mr. Wu, I've seen you very often, but 19 20 maybe behind the scenes. Welcome aboard. Come on up, please. 21 MR. WU: Thank you, Your Honor. Yes, this is my very 22 first appearance, so hopefully I'll remember it for good

> Good morning, Your Honor, Edward Wu, Weil, Gotshal & Manges for the Motors Liquidation Company GUC Trust. Item 1 of

reasons.

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the uncontested matters section of the agenda concerns an objection that the GUC Trust filed as to two automobile dealerships, Castle Buick and Grossinger Autoplex.

The parties have reached a consensual resolution as to this matter, and we will be presenting a proposed stipulation and agreed order for your consideration, which addresses these two claims, as well as two closely related claims by two other automobile dealerships.

Each of the four claims are predicated on a prepetition action in the Illinois state courts, where the claimants were awarded attorney fees against the debtors. The debtors then proceeded to appeal the award of attorney fees, and post an appeal bond. In the process, however, the automatic stay from these cases prevented the appeal from continuing.

The stipulation agreed order that is now being presented for your Court's consideration would result in the withdrawal of the Castle Buick and Grossinger Autoplex claims in these Chapter 11 cases, whether permitting the appeal in the Illinois state courts to resume.

To the extent that the claimants prevail in the Illinois state courts, it would then be able to recover from the appeal bond. The stipulation and agreed order also provides that the matters raised in the objection may also be raised in the appeal.

Page 40 Unless Your Honor has any further questions, we would 1 2 ask that you approve the stipulation. 3 THE COURT: No, you covered it very succinctly, Mr. 4 Wu, and that's perfectly satisfactory to me, and your motion is granted. 5 6 MR. WU: Thank you very much. 7 THE COURT: Thank you. Have a good day. Ms. Greer. 8 MR. GRIFFITHS: Your Honor, with your permission, we 9 just have one further matter. 10 THE COURT: Forgive me. Go ahead, Mr. Griffiths. 11 MR. GRIFFITHS: No problem at all. It's the -- it's 12 item number 2 on the agenda, the motion of Jaspan and 13 Schlesinger to withdraw as counsel of record for Woodbury 14 Cadillac LLC. I have Ms. Shannon Scott to appear on behalf of 15 Jaspan Schlesinger. 16 MS. GREER: Good morning, Your Honor, Stephanie Greer 17 from Dickstein & Shapiro on behalf of the GUC Trust. Your Honor, we've been back and forth with Woodbury on a number of 18 19 issues. I'd like to extend the courtesy to their counsel to 20 give us about a half an hour and see if they can go and resolve 21 with my colleague the terms of an agreement. 22 I hate to put this off to another day, Your Honor. 23 know you have a very busy schedule because we've -- it's just 24 been hard fought to get to this point, and I just don't want to have these guys withdraw as counsel if Your Honor is inclined

Page 41 to grant the motion of course, and then put us in a position where we need to start all over. On the other hand, I know that they're anxious for a resolution one way or the other. So if we could just have a little time, if we work it out, great, if not, Ms. Scott could go forward with her motion. THE COURT: Am I right that there's no objection to the half hour adjournment? MS. SCOTT: There's no objection, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. Let me invite you all to do your thing, and ask simply that somebody stick her head in my chambers when you've either come to agree or agree to disagree. MS. GREER: And, Your Honor, I could go forward with 13 our other matters. THE COURT: Sure. MS. GREER: I just need one second to coordinate with 16 Ms. Scott. (Pause) MS. GREER: Your Honor, I would like my colleague, Colleen Kilfoyle before she walks out the door to have an opportunity to present our uncontested omnibus objections to Your Honor before I get to the rest of it. I'd hate for her to 22 miss out. THE COURT: Sure, come on up, please. MS. KILFOYLE: Good morning, Your Honor, Colleen 25 Kilfoyle with Dickstein Shapiro on behalf of the GUC Trust.

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Today we have three uncontested omnibus objections.
The first is the 282nd omnibus objection based on insufficient
documentation, one claim adjourned and 11 going forward. And
the 283rd omnibus objection to claims, because the liability
associated with the claims, if any, is that of New GM, five
going forward. And the 284th omnibus objection based on
incorrectly classified claims, one adjourned, 16 going forward.
THE COURT: That's all fine, Ms. Kilfoyle.
MS. KILFOYLE: Your Honor, I have the orders with me,
shall I hand them up or submit them to chambers?
THE COURT: I would ask that you drop them off with my
courtroom deputy, Ms. Blum across the hall on your way out.
MS. KILFOYLE: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Thank you.
MS. GREER: Thank you, Your Honor. Stephanie Greer
from Dickstein & Shapiro on behalf of the GUC Trust.
We have I'm pleased to report first, Your Honor,
that we've managed to resolve a number of the claims that were
on the calendar for today. We did contact your chambers on
Friday, hopefully made its way to you.
Both Franco and McNeal, we're going to adjourn those
because we haven't you know, we don't have definitive
documentation at this point, but I'm hopeful that those will
both get resolved, and that they will not come back to us.

In the meantime, I have three -- I'm not sure if

Page 43 uncontested or contested matters before me. Is anyone on the 1 2 phone? Counsel for Brewer? 3 THE COURT: Let's see. I have a phone log that 4 indicates presence for Mr. Kenneth Smith, Thomas Kelliher, are you on the phone, sir? 5 6 MR. KELLIHER: I am. Can you hear me? 7 THE COURT: Yeah, I can hear you pretty well, Mr. 8 Kelliher. Are you here to argue on behalf of your client 9 today? 10 MR. KELLIHER: I am, Judge. It actually has to do 11 with respect to the 282nd omnibus objection. 12 MS. GREER: We were not -- who do you represent, Mr. 13 Kelliher? 14 MR. KELLIHER: I represent Kenneth Smith, and I think 15 there was a problem with the notice. The objection according 16 to my records was filed on August 22nd, 2012, but my office 17 didn't receive it until the Friday before the response date. I guess that was the 14th, I received it on September 14th. And 18 then I -- with the short notice, I tried to quickly file 19 20 something. I didn't get it filed on Monday, the 17th, which I 21 quess was, you know, the due date for it, but I think I filed 22 it the next day or the day after. 23 THE COURT: Well, I'm reluctant Ms. Greer to award a 24 default, but I don't know if it's fair or appropriate to either side to hear it today. Do you have a view? 25

MS. GREER: No, Your Honor, I'm more than happy to adjourn that one. We were not aware of any objection. There was none filed on the docket, but certainly at this point, I'm happy to coordinate with counsel, see if we can get the information that we need and avoid the need to expunge the claim on the basis of insufficient documentation. THE COURT: Mr. Kelliher, my tentative, and I think Ms. Greer just agreed to it, but I want to give you a chance to comment, is that under the circumstances, what I would like to do is kick the matter, invite you and Ms. Greer to have a dialog. And you agree, great, and if you agree to disagree, then I'll hear it when both sides are in a better position to arque the matter, and I've had a chance to prepare in advance of court, which is what I like to do. And as before, I'll permit you to appear by phone. Where are you calling in from? MR. KELLIHER: I'm calling from Chicago, Judge. THE COURT: Uh-huh. Well, I assume again you'd like to avoid a trip to my courtroom if you can avoid it. Are you comfortable with that approach? MR. KELLIHER: Yes, that's fine. THE COURT: Okay. Then why don't we do that, Mr. Kelliher and Ms. Greer. And you folks have a dialog between now and the next omnibus hearing, and I'm grateful for you

wanting to minimize the number of times that you come back.

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Page 45 But I think this is fair to all concerned. 1 2 MS. GREER: Sounds good, Your Honor. 3 THE COURT: Okay. Okay. I was going to go forward with MS. GREER: Autonation, Haack and Brewer. I understood that Ms. Brewer's 5 6 counsel, Archie Sanders was going to attend by phone, but 7 doesn't sound like he is --8 THE COURT: Well, I do show an Archie Sanders on my 9 phone log. Are you on the phone, Mr. Sanders? 10 MR. SANDERS: Yes, Your Honor, I am. 11 THE COURT: Oh, okay. 12 MS. GREER: Okay. Well, Your Honor, what I'll do unless you prefer otherwise is I'll go through the uncontested 13 14 objections first. One is the Haack objection and one is 15 Autonation. I can run through those quickly for Your Honor. 16 Both of those were filed as stand alone objections. 17 The John Haack, Claim No. 62969, this is the one where Mr. 18 Haack alleged he was scared because of a brake defect in his 19 vehicle. Your Honor, as set forth in our papers, it's our 20 position that as a matter of law, Mr. Haack doesn't have a 21 claim because he hasn't been able to show any injury. He 22 certainly acknowledged in his papers that he has no injury to 23 her person, no injury to his property, so we'd ask on that 24 basis, and for the reasons set forth in our objection that the 25 claim be expunged.

Page 46 THE COURT: Okay. Anybody here on that objection, 1 2 either in the courtroom or on the phone? 3 No response. 4 Granted, Ms. Greer. MS. GREER: Thank you, Your Honor. The next one is a 5 6 claim filed by Autonation. Your Honor, this is Claim No. 7 50085, it's a claim -- it's a 502(e)(1)(B) objection, Your 8 Honor. I spoke to counsel for Autonation, Skadden Arps, and 9 had some discussions with them. They've asked that we include 10 some language in the order, which addresses their 502(j) rights 11 in particular. We agreed to do that, so the order that we will 12 submit to Your Honor reflects an agreement by the claimant and 13 the GUC Trust as to 502(j). 14 THE COURT: That's fine. 15 MS. GREER: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor. Anything 16 else you need to hear on that one? 17 THE COURT: No, I guess we're down to Mr. Sanders and 18 Ms. Brewer. MS. GREER: Thank you. Your Honor, one second, I have 19 20 a paper problem here. 21 THE COURT: Yes. 22 (Pause) 23 MS. GREER: I think it might have walked out the door. 24 That's okay though. 25 Your Honor, simply put, this is a claim filed by a

claimant 11 months late. Your Honor, counsel, Mr. Sanders, filed the claim. It's his position that he -- there is excusable neglect because he switched law firms. Your Honor, he did not provide notice to the Court in the underlying litigation that he switched law firms, so the notice was given to the address on the Court's docket.

So, Your Honor, I think -- thank you very much.

First, I guess, Your Honor, as we set forth in our papers, the first issue is the presumption that the mail was received.

This applies where it's the wrong address or not, and as Judge Lifland found in Macy's, of course, the presumption attaches because when you mail something, it's also presumed that it will be forwarded to the new address.

In this case, Mr. Sanders has not provided anything at all to defeat that presumption. In any event, Mr. Sanders can't show excusable neglect. There is nothing in his papers to support any sort of excusable neglect, especially given that Mr. Sanders himself should've been provided notice to the debtors when he changed an address. I think the case law is clear.

The case law that we cite, Akerage (ph), Telligent, among others, all those cases stand for the proposition that it is the attorney's responsibility. And in actually one of the cases, I think it's Akerage, is a pro se claimant's responsibility to provide the debtors with any notice of a

change of address. There's certainly no excusable neglect here, Your Honor. I think it's pretty clear there's neglect, but not excusable neglect.

So unless Your Honor has any questions, we can perhaps give Ms. Brewer's counsel an opportunity to be heard, and I can reserve our right to reply.

THE COURT: Let me ask you a question, Ms. Greer. Is this a case or the case where you worked out a settlement with Mr. Sanders, but his client, Ms. Brewer, was -- had failed to execute the settlement papers?

MS. GREER: Yes, Your Honor. We had started engaging in a dialogue with Mr. Brewer when he filed his response to our original objection probably over a year ago now, and we, you know, resolved it for relatively, you know, diminimus amount of money. Everybody seemed amenable, and as time went on, I wrote — let Mr. Sanders — left a message after message, sent him letter after letter saying if you don't sign the settlement agreement, we are going to be forced to go forward with this objection. You know, no one has any interest in going forward with an objection on the basis that their — someone's counsel failed to do something. And we are happy to have had the opportunity to resolve that. But unfortunately Mr. Sanders has not been able to get his client's signature.

He called me on Thursday and said, more time, more time, and I said no more time. You know, we're done providing

time on this. I think we have very strong arguments as to why this is inexcusable neglect, and I think at this point our client just wants this one off the register.

THE COURT: Uh-huh. Okay. Mr. Sanders?

MR. SANDERS: Yes, Your Honor. As I stated in our papers, I believe there was excusable neglect in this case. Unfortunately, it's one of those circumstances where apparently the proof of claim was filed at about the same time the switch of law firms was made. And so I did not receive the notice of proof of claim that had been filed. I did receive notice when the state court set this case for a status conference, and I received notice of that. And GM's local counsel at that point advised me about the -- there was an issue involving the proof of claim. Once I learned that, I immediately did file a proof of claim. So that's a -- and I can answer any questions the Court might have.

THE COURT: No, thank you. Ms. Greer, reply?

MS. GREER: Yes, Your Honor. A few things. First,
Your Honor, it is -- Mr. Sanders has never changed his address
with the Court. So on the underlying litigation, the docket
still reads, and we attach that to our reply, the underlying
docket still has his old address on it. So Mr. Sanders has
taken no steps to ensure that he's gotten the proper notice.

Indeed, he must have known that the case was stayed, because the state -- you know, after the bankruptcy case was

filed. So in that regard, certainly had notice of the bankruptcy, and it is his obligation to obtain information about the bar date, and to provide his new address to the debtors.

You know, it's unfortunate that his -- as a matter of law, that his client is bound by the actions or inactions in this case of her attorney. And therefore, we think the claim should be expunged.

THE COURT: Okay. Every --

MR. SANDERS: Your Honor, I would like to add just one small thing. As far as the docket sheet is concerned, the way -- it's my understanding the state court does it. The address that is entered and that appears on the docket sheet is the address of the attorney at the time the case is filed. At some point later, if an address -- if an attorney changes his address, there's another way of dealing with that, but they do not go back and change your address on every case on every docket sheet. It would be -- the address appears to say, basically was, at the time the case was filed, although things may have changed since then.

THE COURT: Okay. Ladies and gentlemen, I'm sustaining the GUC Trust objection to this claim. And will be disallowing it, although I will be staying my ruling or the effectiveness for three weeks from today to give Ms. Brewer one last chance to accept the settlement if she wants it. And the

following are the bases for the exercise of my discretion in connection with this determination.

First, as Ms. Greer properly observed, there is a presumption of receipt for mailing, and that presumption is of particular significance when the address that has been used for the mailing is the exact address that has been used by the claimant.

I take it as true that state court rules may not impose the same expectations of a notification of change of address, but frankly, folks, that is the way by which the bankruptcy court has to function. People invoking the claims process must recognize the possibility, the foreseeability that a claims objection may be filed, and the only way by which the estates of the world, the debtors-in-possession or the creditors who may succeed them under confirmed plans can proceed is by contacting people at the last address that they were given.

Now, that is not to say that I find counsel to have been negligent in any way, but the burden is on the claimant to show excusable neglect. And here as Ms. Greer properly observed, while there is neglect within the meaning of that rule, the claimant has failed to meet her burden of showing excusable neglect.

Now with that said, I hate to deprive a claimant of any opportunity to recover anything, and I think at the very

least, she should have the ability to mitigate her damages. So therefore, although this may be displease the GUC Trust, I'm going to give her one last chance to accept that settlement.

If she doesn't, there will be no recovery, but of course, this is without prejudice to her rights to appeal.

But although I'm reluctant to use the words like enough is enough because I do recognize that every claims allowance affects a claimant's life, the law in this area is not particularly debatable, nor are the facts in any way in material dispute.

So, Ms. Greer, you are to settle an order in accordance with the foregoing. One week, seven calendar days by mail or e-mail to register objections to the form of the proposed order, but the proposed order is also to say that it shall become effective three weeks after the date of its entry. And the legislative history of this order is going to be that if Ms. Brewer signs the settlement agreement in three weeks or the time between today and the three weeks after entry of the order, I will not sign the ultimate order. But the ruling should be clear and unmistakable.

Okay? Anything further from either side, not by way of reargument but any open matters?

MR. SANDERS: No, Your Honor.

MS. GREER: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. And am I right, Ms. Greer and Mr.

Page 53 1 Griffiths, that that concludes our work for today, except for 2 the matter that they're trying to deal with out in the hall? 3 MS. GREER: For that one and one other thing, Your 4 I just wanted to check if Your Honor needs anything further from us on the Shaw order. You had written a 5 decision --6 7 THE COURT: No, that's in a pile that I've got -- I think you have given me a proposed order consistent with my 8 9 written opinion if I'm not mistaken. 10 MS. GREER: Yes, Your Honor. 11 THE COURT: But you're diplomatically reminding me 12 that the time for appeal and that can't start to run until I 13 enter the order. 14 MS. GREER: Yes, Your Honor. 15 THE COURT: I understand. 16 MS. GREER: Okay. Thank you. 17 MR. SANDERS: Your Honor, this is Mr. Sanders, may I 18 be excused, please? THE COURT: Yes, and I am right that everybody in the 19 20 courtroom can now be excused? 21 Okay. Yes, sir, you may be excused. 22 MR. SANDERS: Thank you, Your Honor. 23 THE COURT: Can I ask you, sir, to tell your client 24 what happened today, Mr. Sanders, and I can't give your client 25 legal advice, but you may want to tell her that the kind of

Page 54 1 decision that I had which is one of discretion, is often 2 sustained on appeal. And I'm not telling the appellate courts 3 how to do things, or you how to do things, or for that matter 4 your client to do things, but you may want to look long and 5 hard about whether she should sign that settlement agreement. 6 MR. SANDERS: I understand, Your Honor, and I will 7 definitely pass that on to the client. 8 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you very much, we're 9 adjourned. 10 (Concluded at 11:10 a.m.) 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

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RULINGS			
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Page 56 1 CERTIFICATION 2 I, Sheila G. Orms, certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the official electronic sound recording of the 3 4 proceedings in the above-entitled matter. 5 6 Dated: September 25, 2012 7 Digitally signed by Sheila Orms Sheila Orms DN: cn=Sheila Orms, o, ou, email=digital1@veritext.com, c=US Date: 2012.09.26 12:14:59 -04'00' 8 9 Signature of Approved Transcriber 10 11 Veritext 12 200 Old Country Road 13 Suite 580 14 Mineola, NY 11501 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25